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


## *Chinese Affairs*


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## *Chinese Affairs*

This publication is prepared by the China branches of the East Asia - Pacific Division of the Office of Current Intelligence, with contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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## Peking and the PRG: Warmth and Restraint

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An official visit to China last week by a Viet Cong delegation headed by PRG chairman Nguyen Huu Tho was noteworthy both for the warmth shown by the Chinese and for the lack of militancy displayed by the visitors. Large crowds and a host of senior Chinese officials, including Chou En-lai and five other Politburo members, greeted the Vietnamese at the airport. A banquet for Tho's group was well attended, and the delegation had an audience with Mao.

Peking's welcome was as impressive as that given the heads of North Vietnam's party and government last June, and in some respects warmer. In his banquet speech, for instance, Chou used more specific formulations in expressing Chinese solidarity with the South Vietnamese than he did last June with the northerners. Nearly twice as many Chinese attended a public rally for the southerners as were present at a similar gathering in June.

Chou's substantive remarks and an editorial in *People's Daily* reiterated in clear terms Peking's strong preference for a political solution over renewed military struggle in South Vietnam. Like many authoritative Chinese spokesmen before him, Chou stressed that the war has ended, that the situation has entered a "new stage," and that the Vietnamese Communists should concentrate on strengthening their political and economic position in the South.

Chou's comments on the status of the cease-fire were tepid compared to recent Vietnamese Communist language. Chou spoke in elliptical terms, calling the situation "acute and complex." He reaffirmed Chinese support for thorough implementation of the cease-fire and blamed Saigon for all the difficulties, saying nothing about the US. Chou did not endorse any Communist military activity in retaliation for South Vietnamese actions, nor did he hint that Peking would replace war materiel expended in such an effort. The agreement on "gratuitous" Chinese aid that was signed during the visit mentioned only economic assistance, and there were no top-level Chinese military figures present at the signing.

The PRG muted its customary rhetoric. Tho omitted the usual warnings about "punishing" the Thieu regime and hitting Saigon's base areas. He said merely that the PRG "is endowed with the right to adopt resolute measures" to defend itself. There was no suggestion that the PRG is planning actions that might jeopardize the Paris accord or otherwise upset Peking. Tho declared, "The South Vietnamese people are determined to fulfill their national and internationalist duties so as not to disappoint the expectations of the fraternal Chinese people." For the southern Communists, in particular, this reference to constraints imposed from the outside is unusually explicit and free of pique.

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There clearly were differences between the two sides, but the talks between Chou and Tho were described by NCNA as "most cordial and friendly." This suggests that the two found a genuine community of interest, even though Peking's insistence on the primacy of the political struggle in the South seems to clash with the belief of many southern Communists that a return to large-scale fighting is both necessary and desirable.

Peking has for some time nurtured direct links with the South Vietnamese Communists although neither Peking nor the PRG can have any illusions about the possibility of doing very much behind Hanoi's back. The Chinese leadership has often exceeded protocol requirements in receiving PRG visitors, and Chinese propaganda has made much of direct aid shipments to the southern Communists. Some observers (not all of them unbiased) have even commented that Peking actually seems to have closer ties with the PRG than with Hanoi.

Peking's motivation seems fairly straightforward. Not only does Peking want to help the PRG establish its credentials as a legitimate government, but Peking also sees the maintenance of its own channels to the southerners, independent of Hanoi, as a worthwhile long-term investment. Moreover, there no doubt are many Chinese whose feelings for the revolutionary achievements of the southern Communists are strong and warm, and their effusiveness comes naturally. Mao, for instance, told Tho that China "should thank you people...because you have fought many years."

The lack of bite in the PRG's rhetoric is harder to explain. To some extent the southerners may simply have been deferring to the attitudes of their hosts, but this by itself explains neither the warmth of their language nor Tho's explicit bow to Chinese sensitivities. It may also be that Tho was seeking to reassure the Chinese that whatever military action the Communists are planning in the South, it is not the sort that Peking needs to worry about. Indeed, if the exchanges between the two sides are to be taken at face value, the PRG gave the Chinese reassurances that the Communists' military intentions were not overly ambitious, and the Chinese responded with commitments of economic aid. [REDACTED]

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### Friction Over the Militia

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Peking's effort to build up the militia has taken on some potentially serious political overtones. Treatment of militia anniversaries in the domestic media earlier this year produced only veiled glimpses of controversial political themes, but recent broadcasts strongly suggest that a disagreement over the proper role of the militia has now become part of intra-party policy debates and political maneuvering.

Two positions can be discerned. One side of the debate was presented in a series of articles broadcast over Peking domestic service on 26 October. The articles attack the "Lin Piao clique" for two erroneous notions--that the central task of militia units is to concentrate on production and that the authorities would lose control of the militia if too many units were organized. One article emphasized the effectiveness of the militia in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, a goal to be achieved by "waging class struggle." "Some people are of the opinion that it is unthinkable for the militia to participate in class struggle in society; others hold that the participation of militiamen in class struggle in society will affect the production of their units." These views are labeled as wrong and are ominously described as "a reflection within our ranks--of the pernicious influence of the Lin Piao anti-party clique's fallacies." This argument apparently is intended to encourage increased participation by militiamen in the political affairs of production units.

The other side of the debate is less well defined, but appears to minimize the militia's role in politics. The militia is encouraged to participate in war preparations, military training, security duties, and production--but not in political agitation. In provinces that shun political participation by the militia, there are differences of degree. For example, border provinces tend to play up war preparations and training to meet the external threat while provinces in South China stress internal security duties, an apparent reflection of the bothersome crime problem there.

Not all provinces have made authoritative comments on the militia, so it is difficult to say where most provincial leaders stand. The provincial statements that are available reinforce the notion that powerful central leaders are at odds. Recent broadcasts from the Manchurian bailiwick of Politburo member and regional military boss Ch'en Hsi-lien suggest that he does not favor militiamen placing class struggle ahead of other roles. On the other hand, a long and authoritative broadcast from Anhwei, home province of Politburo standing committee member and army political department head Li Te-sheng, stressed political study and the development of political activists among militiamen.

The role of the militia has been clearly linked to the political activities of other recently rebuilt mass organizations. Many radio broadcasts describing provincial-level

militia work conferences noted the participation of representatives from trade union organizations, the Young Communist League, the Women's Federation, and the Red Guards. It is possible that some top leaders hope to mobilize these mass organizations to carry out leftist-style criticism of government and party organizations in order to slow or even reverse the moderate trend in policy. A provincial broadcast on 11 November, for example, described a campaign to criticize factory management for "rightist conservatism." Many factory workers are, of course, militiamen. A number of slogans such as "going against the tide" and "lifting the lid off class struggle" could also be used to justify leftist criticism. But, regardless of their original intent, these same slogans could easily be used by elements of the political right to assault the left.

Available evidence suggests that the proponents of heavy militia involvement in "class struggle" do not appear to be carrying the day. The fact that contrasting views can continue to be aired in the Peking press suggests that powerful personalities are involved and that the issue has not been resolved.

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## Sino-Soviet Relations: A Slight Decline in Tension

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In his report to the Tenth Party Congress in August, Chou En-lai not only warned of a possible "surprise attack" from the USSR, but also said that the Sino-Soviet boundary question should be settled "through negotiations free from any threat." Whether Moscow actually threatened Peking with military force is uncertain, but what is now clear is that the Chinese had rejected a Soviet proposal in June for a partial solution to the boundary question, that Moscow had then mounted a broad and intensive propaganda attack on China, and that numerous Chinese officials in Peking and abroad were speaking in ominous terms of future Soviet attacks. Indeed, when French President Pompidou visited Peking in early September, he and his delegation were told by Chinese officials at all levels that China feared a Soviet attack by the end of the year.

In contrast to the alarmist note that was sounded to the French, the delegations headed by prime ministers Trudeau and Whitlam in October found the Chinese far more relaxed about Moscow. While this calmer approach was in part a result of Peking's realization that its hyperbole with the French was counter-productive, it may also have stemmed from Peking's reading of some tenuous signals from Moscow.

The first signal came in Brezhnev's Tashkent speech on 24 September. Buried at the end of a long harangue lambasting the Chinese for failing to respond to Moscow's proposal last June, Brezhnev observed that the border question would have to be solved under conditions "free of any threat." Soon afterwards, a *Pravda* editorial used exactly the same words, a formulation that was obviously picked up from the language used by Chou En-lai at the Tenth Party Congress. And in November, Peking picked up the refrain in a relatively mild message to Moscow on the occasion of Soviet National Day.

The bantering of this phrase back and forth should not be seen as an indication that the long-stalled Sino-Soviet border talks may soon show progress. On the contrary, Moscow's recent decision to have their chief negotiator at the talks resume other duties in the Foreign Ministry suggests that Moscow wishes the talks to be downgraded. The exchange, plus the patently calmer mood in Peking, does suggest that the Chinese are reading Moscow's words as signaling a desire to reduce bilateral tension to the level that had obtained prior to this summer's escalation.

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The Cultural Battlefield

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Amid all the obscurity of the anti-Confucius campaign, *People's Daily* on 31 October made a surprisingly forthright statement when it warned that those who lose political and economic power will counterattack in the cultural field. Inasmuch as Madame Mao was dropped in party standing at the party congress last August, her latest play looks very much like the kind of counterattack *People's Daily* warned against.

The Hong Kong Consulate General, which has the script of the new play "Tuchuan Mountain" (it is not yet available here), suggests that the character of the competent female party representative who saves the headstrong peasant leader from his own mistakes is Chiang Ching and that the "bumbling, unsophisticated" peasant leader is Chou En-lai. The tip-off comes in a scene that apparently is not germane to the plot, but that serves to give a real-life identity to the two characters. The female party official tells the peasant that his sandals are worn through. This is an exact replica of a passage in "In his Mind, A Million Bold Warriors," an account of Mao's leadership during the civil war, in which Chiang Ching tells Chou his shoes have holes in them. The story about Chou's shoes wearing out is well-known in China, and the book containing the particular comment by Madame Mao was widely republished after Lin Piao's demise.

"Tuchuan Mountain" premiered at the 1 October National Day celebrations. Madame Mao was not present, but Chou was, and if the shoe incident was lost on most of the audience, it could not have been lost on Chou. Given Chiang Ching's jealous control over cultural affairs, it seems reasonable to assume that Chou's first glimpse of the new play came on National Day. Under the circumstances, Madame Mao may well have chosen to absent herself from the opening of her play rather than risk a possible rerun of an encounter with Chou that took place the previous National Day. On that occasion, during the performance of one of the First Lady's plays, the two were seen on national television in an animated conversation, with Chou wagging his finger at Mao's wife.

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Peking and the Overseas Chinese

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China's current policy toward the overseas Chinese is designed to help improve Peking's relations with Southeast Asian nations and to broaden contacts with overseas Chinese communities that are useful to the regime. The policy, as contained in statements by leading members of the Chinese Government, including Chou En-lai, returns to pre - Cultural Revolution solutions to the problem and eliminates dual nationality for Chinese living in Southeast Asia. To help allay the suspicions of Southeast Asian governments, Peking has abolished the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and turned its responsibilities over to the Foreign Ministry.

Leaders in Peking have emphasized that overseas Chinese should live in friendship with the local population and abide by local laws. Chou En-lai has added his prestige to this exhortation, urging Chinese living abroad to learn the language of the country of residence and to inter-marry. During Australian Prime Minister Whitlam's visit to Peking, Chou praised overseas Chinese who contribute to and take out citizenship in their countries of residence. Although China is not entirely renouncing special responsibility for those overseas Chinese who are not citizens of the countries in which they reside, it is encouraging these individuals to acquire local citizenship. Peking has made clear that it will not intervene with local governments on behalf of the overseas Chinese except in extreme circumstances. For example, Chinese media reported the recent anti-Chinese riot in Bandung, Indonesia in a factual, low-key manner, without criticizing the Indonesian Government or suggesting that China had any right to intervene.

Peking is most concerned about the problem of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, because it is impeding China's attempts to improve relations there. Its fears have been heightened by indications that the USSR is seeking to exploit the issue. A Moscow radio broadcast in Indonesian in March 1973, for example, accused China of instigating overseas Chinese to put pressure on several Asian countries by creating economic chaos.

The recent Peking decisions on overseas Chinese policy have, in fact, opened the way for diplomatic relations with Malaysia early next year. Talks on recognition had stalled last summer because of Kuala Lumpur's demand that Peking acknowledge Malaysian sovereignty over some 200,000 stateless Chinese in Malaysia. China's new policy, which in effect limits Peking's interest in the local affairs of overseas Chinese, led to resumption of Sino-Malaysian talks early this month and to Malaysian predictions of diplomatic relations in early 1974.

By early November, the Chinese were reportedly prepared to take further steps to encourage progress in relations with other Southeast Asian countries. According

to Chou En-lai, Peking intends to sign an agreement on the nationality of overseas Chinese with friendly countries such as North Vietnam and to promulgate a law stating that Chinese who take the nationality of another country have no claim to Chinese nationality. This gesture, while useful diplomatically, is largely cosmetic. Indonesia, for example, does not wish to grant citizenship to large numbers of overseas Chinese even if they ask for it. The Chinese announcement is primarily an assurance that Peking will not meddle in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian nations.

Even as Peking tries to put some distance between itself and the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, it is courting people of Chinese origin in Japan, Canada, and the US. Its motives are both political and economic. Peking hopes to gain the good will of Chinese communities in these countries in order to gain support for its policies and to undercut the strong position of the Chinese Nationalists. It is encouraging the 50,000 stateless Chinese in Japan to adopt Communist Chinese citizenship and hopes to use Chinese-American scientists to attain greater access to the international scientific community. Although Peking is discouraging any general influx of overseas Chinese into China, it may want some Chinese-American scientists to return to participate in high priority projects.

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## In the Market for Color TV

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China appears ready to vault into color television, even though its capabilities in black and white television remain largely undeveloped. After months of study of transmitting and receiving systems in Japan, France, West Germany, and the US, the Chinese seem ready to negotiate large purchases of equipment and technology, including manufacturing facilities. China's entry into the color television field will cost upwards of \$100 million in scarce foreign exchange, an indication that the Chinese attach considerable importance to the program.

There are only about 400,000 television receivers in China—all black and white. Although production has increased rapidly since 1969, total output this year is not likely to exceed 115,000 sets. Obsolescent Soviet and East European technology is still used in Chinese television receivers, most of which have 14-inch picture tubes. In 1971-72 negotiations with British and Japanese firms for a complete plant to produce 300,000 black-and-white picture tubes per year were not fruitful. Now, the Chinese have redirected their efforts toward acquiring color equipment and technology.

Television is an important propaganda tool for the Peking regime, and color is likely to increase the impact of TV on the audience. Telecasts of speeches, revolutionary operas, and public events stress the unity of China under Mao and provide guidance on political and economic campaigns. For this purpose China does not need a great many television receivers because most of its sets are installed in public meeting places in communes, industrial plants, military units, and schools.

Chinese interest in Western equipment and manufacturing facilities covers the whole range of the color television process, from selection of a color transmission system—NTSC, PAL, or SECAM—to receivers, studio equipment, and related manufacturing equipment and technology. (NTSC, the US system, is also used in Canada, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. PAL, a West German system, is used in Western Europe, except France. SECAM, a French system, is used in France, USSR, and Eastern Europe.) In late 1972 and early 1973, Peking dispatched a number of television survey teams to study these three color systems and related manufacturing facilities, and the producing firms were invited to demonstrate their systems and equipment at technical exhibitions in China. RCA received an invitation to bid on a complete production facility for 250,000 color picture tubes per year in sizes from 10 to 20 inches employing RCA's three-gun black matrix design.

While China has not yet committed itself to a particular color broadcasting system, there is considerable evidence that it favors the PAL system of AEG-Telefunken in West Germany. Within the past year Peking has imported nearly

\$2-million worth of color television studio equipment incorporating PAL technology. Moreover, a number of color television broadcasting vans adaptable to PAL have been purchased from British and Japanese manufacturers at a cost of more than \$1.5 million. The Chinese also have imported, studied, and trial-manufactured Japanese solid state color television receivers which have unique circuits for receiving PAL color signals. In May 1973, trial color broadcasts were begun at the Peking Television Station using the PAL process, and similar trial broadcasts are reportedly planned or are under way at the Shanghai and Canton television stations. The PAL process is particularly advantageous for transmission over China's newly installed broadband microwave radio relay and coaxial cable network because, unlike the NTSC system, it does not require precise phase and amplitude control of the signal as it passes through the numerous repeater stations of the communications system.

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## Chinese Military Advisers: Occasionally Less Loved

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Peking has sent to black Africa a limited flow of military material and a number of military advisers and technicians. Occasionally, however, the Chinese have failed to live up to their role as selfless friends, and friction has developed between adviser and client. This friction is heightened by African dissatisfaction with the kind of military training provided. Peking emphasizes individual and small-unit training directed against better-armed opponents. Black African military officers, principally trained by the British and French, are more interested in tactics that stress sophisticated equipment and the employment of large units even though such training may not be relevant.

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Although the difficulties between the Chinese and Africans are not insurmountable, it is clear that Peking's military assistance programs in Africa have not been an overwhelming success. If the Chinese were to spend more time in the future in tailoring their military assistance to African desires, Peking might get increased political mileage out of its programs in Africa.

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## Continuing Coolness Toward India

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Peking seems less disposed toward more normal relations with India than at any time since the Indo-Pakistani war in late 1971 put an end to a promising move toward rapprochement. The Chinese apparently have attached conditions to normalization that, at best, are unlikely to materialize for months.

Chinese officials from Chou En-lai down have made clear for some time that Peking, because of its commitments to Pakistan, could not move toward closer relations with India unless New Delhi and Bangladesh freed without trial 195 Pakistani prisoners Dacca accuses of war crimes.

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Peking once considered friendly relations with India as the key to a strong Chinese position in South Asia, but has become suspicious of New Delhi's Soviet connection, particularly the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty concluded in 1971. More recently, the Chinese have claimed that tensions along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan and Iran are the by-products of an aggressive Soviet power play. They are concerned that Moscow will extend its influence through surrogates like India. Indeed, an NCNA article on 21 November charged Moscow with using New Delhi's "expansionist ambitions" toward neighboring states as the cutting edge of Soviet policy in the region. NCNA said the Soviets were bent on establishing passage through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. In Peking's harshest language regarding India in some time, the article also asserted that Soviets in New Delhi had directed the fighting during the 1971 war.

Chinese suspicions are likely to be deepened by the Brezhnev visit to India, particularly if the two sides reach agreement on a new Soviet military aid pact.

Fresh Soviet military deliveries to New Delhi would clearly lead to renewed Pakistani arms requests of Peking.

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Even worse in Peking's eyes would be Indian agreement (which is unlikely) to a long-standing Soviet request for shore facilities for the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean. This would make a Soviet military presence a permanent feature in South Asia and significantly alter the region's power balance.


Peking is playing what few cards it has to forestall such Soviet gains. Along with its own commentary, NCNA recently has replayed extracts from articles carried



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by the press in the region that tend to put a negative cast on Moscow's behavior. The



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## 25X1 Political Notes

Mao's latest meeting with foreign dignitaries revealed intriguing pluses and minuses for certain top party leaders. On 19 November, Mao received representatives of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. In addition to Chou En-lai, Politburo standing committee members Chang Chun-chiao and Li Te-sheng attended the session. Both Chang and Li greeted the visitors at the gate of Mao's residence. Chang had attended a Mao reception once before, also in conjunction with Vietnamese visitors, but this was a first for Li Te-sheng, a military man, and will probably strengthen speculation that he is to be named minister of defense. Chang and Li emerged from the recent party congress as men to watch, and their presence in Mao's study has for the moment put in the shadows China's third rising star, young vice-chairman Wang Hung-wen. Until the visit of Secretary of State Kissinger, Wang had attended all of Mao's meetings with foreigners since the party congress and had greeted the visitors at Mao's door. At the chairman's meeting with the Sierra Leone president on 7 November, Wang received pride of place in a formal photograph taken at Mao's request. The fact that he has missed two consecutive meetings and lost his door-man duties lends credence to rumors that veteran party officials may be trying to cut Wang down to size.

\* \* \* \*

Even in Shanghai, where radical policies are strongly supported, there is apparently room for at least two sides to policy questions. Shanghai launched the current squabble over allowing students to cheat on tests, but a local broadcast on 17 November took a moderate line on scientific research in the universities--unusual these days in propaganda broadcasts on education and particularly unusual for Shanghai. The broadcast resurrected several themes that were common during 1972, when moderate educational policies made gains, but which have been rare in recent months. It called several times for letting "100 flowers bloom," warned that intellectuals must be "protected," and defended the right to do research on Western scientific theories. Shanghai is the base of four Politburo members, and it seems likely that they are divided on education. Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan may be urging the radical line, while Chang Chun-chiao and possibly Wang Hung-wen support the moderate approach. In any case, Shanghai radio's sharp turn-around on educational issues reflects the serious policy debates currently being conducted throughout the country.

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"Lifting the lid off class struggle," a term used by leftists during the Cultural Revolution to encourage political activism, reappeared on 14 November in the media

[redacted]

of two provinces. The term is explosive in the current atmosphere of debate, and it could signal new political turmoil. On both occasions, the expression was used in the context of agricultural policy, suggesting that this area too is under discussion. There were differences in treatment. The Kwangtung provincial newspaper issued a scathing denunciation of rural party officials and blamed their political shortcomings for the re-emergence of unspecified "capitalist tendencies" in the rural areas. Three times the paper said that "lifting the lid off class struggle" was the best way for errant cadre to correct their failings. A Hupeh broadcast, however, was careful to exempt some popular moderate policies from the attack on "capitalist tendencies" and in general took a moderate line on agricultural policies. In this context, Hupeh's single reference to "lifting the lid" sounded like an attempt to appease the advocates of political struggle while preserving the current moderate policies.

\* \* \* \*

Dissatisfaction with working conditions has led to confrontations between workers and cadre in recent weeks. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Disturbances of this sort occur periodically, but it is unlikely that in this instance a wage increase will be granted as happened a year ago. Ideological rather than material incentives probably were still being offered as spurs to production in a recent series of provincial trade union meetings.

\* \* \* \*

China's mass organizations are being drafted to aid the troublesome down-to-the-countryside youth program. According to a Heilungkiang broadcast, a group was organized by the provincial Women's Federation and Youth League to investigate the living conditions of youth in the countryside. The broadcast carefully identifies the members of the group as parents of children in the program. Broadcasts from other areas have also stressed the contribution parents can make in getting their offspring to accept rural assignments and have tried to allay parental concerns. The effort to pressure parents to encourage their children to go to the countryside is likely to be more successful now that illegal exemptions of cadre children are being corrected. [redacted]

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## CHRONOLOGY

6 Nov	Chinese sign contract for French-produced Superfrelon helicopters with guarantees that they will be used for "civil purposes."	25X1
13 Nov	Secretary Kissinger ends visit to China.	25X1
15 Nov	President Stevens of Sierra Leone ends visit to China.	25X1
16 Nov	National Council for US-China Trade completes successful 12-day visit to China.	25X1
	Senegalese Minister of Planning and Cooperation arrives in Peking.	25X1
	Asian Games Federation Council votes to admit PRC and to expel Taiwan from 1974 Asian Games.	25X1
18-21 Nov	PRG delegation headed by Nguyen Huu Tho visits Peking, sees Mao, holds talks with Chou, and is feted at banquet and public rally.	25X1
19 Nov	West German Minister of Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrives for seven-day visit.	25X1
20-25 Nov	Zaire Foreign Minister visits Peking, meets Chou En-lai.	25X1
22 Nov	First American student to attend new Chinese Language Institute for Foreigners arrives in China.	25X1
22 Nov	Consensus statement on Korean issue announced at the UN.	25X1
23 Nov	Chinese "friendship delegation" headed by relatively low-level central committee members leaves for visit to areas of Laos controlled by Pathet Lao.	25X1
23 Nov	Chou En-lai receives visiting Romanian trade delegation.	25X1

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